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THE EFFECT OF PROPOSED RULES 7 THROUGH 25
ON PRESENT WASHINGTON PROCEDT.RESt
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER*
On January 2, 1957, the Supreme Court of Washington published
the pleading and party rules, previously recommended by the Judicial
Council for adoption as part of the procedural law of this state.' The
court did not make the rules effective but requested criticism and study
by members of the bar.2 This preliminary publication permits examina-
tion for possible defects in the new procedure and acquaints the lawyers
of the state with the rules in advance of their effective date.
For aid in the study of the proposed rules, this article will review the
general changes they would make in present Washington procedure.
Since the proposed rules were copied almost verbatim from the
federal rules, they are not untested and untried. They have been used
in the federal courts for almost two decades. All eighty-six of the
federal rules, including the proposed rules, have been adopted in ten
states, two territories and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.3 Experi-
ence with them has been very satisfactory in the federal courts, and so
far as can be ascertained from written sources, reaction is favorable in
the states and territories mentioned.'
The change-over to the proposed rules could probably be accom-
plished with little difficulty. There would be fewer problems in Wash-
ington than were faced by lawyers in the jurisdictions which adopted
all of the federal rules. Yet there is testimony that in those jurisdic-
tions no great difficulty was encountered.' This was undoubtedly due
t In this issue Professor Meisenholder discusses proposed rules 7 to 12. Discussion
of proposed rules 13 to 25 will appear in the December issue of the law review.
* Professor, School of Law, University of Washington.
2 149 Wash. Dec. i-xix (1957).
2 It was stated that the recommended rules had not yet been given consideration by
the court. See footnote 1, supra.
3 The ten states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. The movement to adopt the federal
rules in state jurisdictions is reviewed in Holtzoff, Judicial Procedure Reform: The
Leadership of the Supreme Court, 43 A.B.A.J. 215, 217 (1957).
4 An explanation of their successful use in federal courts is contained in an article
by Judge Clark, Alabamads Procedural Reform and the National Movement, 9 Ala. L.
Rev. 167, 168-169 (1957). Experience in various states is summarized in: Allen, The
New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183 (1955) ; Keely, How Colorado Conformed State
to Federal Civil Procedure, 16 F.R.D. 291 (1955) ; Clapp, Making the Federal Rules
a Part of New Jersey's Practice, 16 F.R.D. 39 (1955) ; Robertson, New Mexico Rules
of Civil Procedure, 16 F.R.D. 489 (1955). A number of articles on Colorado's ten-year
experience are contained in 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 500-627 (1951).
. See articles cited in footnote 4, supra.
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in part to the fact that the federal rules embody some familiar proce-
dures. There is also a wealth of readily accessible written material
explaining the rules and publishing the memorandum decisions of
federal trial courts.6
Turning to the general objectives of the proposed pleading rules, the
more detailed comments below indicate they would tend to simplify
the pleading stage of a suit. One of the assumptions underlying the
proposed rules is the notion that the code pleading system does not
always formulate the issues satisfactorily. After the pleadings are at
issue, it is not unusual that the pleadings alone will fail to reveal the
real facts of the controversy although the purpose of the pleadings is
to set forth the facts and form the fact issues. At the same time, it is
said that the process of code pleading emphasizes various technicalities.
Particularly, it places a premium upon stating the facts in a pleading
broadly enough, and yet narrowly enough, to avoid attack upon it.
By comparison, the proposed rules intentionally reflect the viewpoint
that the major purpose of the pleadings is to notify the opponent of a
party's general positions and to define the issues only in a general way.
Thus, although the rules do not use the words, "notice pleading" is
emphasized. But the rules do not simply embody a system of notice
pleading, for the pleadings should tend to point up the general issues
of law and fact between the parties. Generality of statement is author-
ized, but the rules still make necessary "the statement of circumstances,
occurrences and events in support of the claim" and require that "the
complaint must disclose information with sufficient definiteness. '1
To the extent that general pleadings do not point up fact issues, and
indicate any detailed facts, the facts and issues may be revealed by the
use of the federal pre-trial devices which are already authorized in
Washington-deposition and discovery, motion for summary judgment
and pre-trial conference. In passing judgment on the proposed rules
one must constantly keep in mind the availability of these procedures.
The general theory of the proposed party and joinder of issue rules
is also clear. Disregarding technical pleading considerations, the rules
attempt to answer this basic question: Is it fair and is it convenient to
6 Two special sets of volumes contain the decisions concerning the federal rules.
There are four major treatises and five sets of form books. See Fowler, Available Re-
search Materials on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 259 (1957).
7 Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 18-19 (1955).
The general purpose of federal pleadings is discussed at length in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAc~rxc 1605-1618, 1640-1668 (2nd ed. 1948).
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have particular issues and parties involved in one trial? The rules are
based on the idea that the subject matter of issues and parties should
not be primarily related to pleading; rather, the whole subject should
be related to fairness and convenience of trial. Although they set forth
various restrictions at the pleading stage of a suit, on an overall basis
they are liberal in dealing with the subjects of issues and parties at
this stage. To promote convenience and fairness of trial, they provide
for separate or combined trials largely at the discretion of the trial
court.
The comment which follows indicates how these objectives are ac-
complished, but before each rule is discussed a special problem should
be mentioned. In the past there have been problems of relating some of
the present Washington court rules to similar statutory sections (to
say nothing of the inconvenience and time necessary to check back and
forth) .' Many of such problems with respect to the recommended rules
could be avoided by promulgation of an official list of statutes which
would be abrogated or otherwise affected. The fact that the supreme
court has already adopted this technique makes it probable that an
appropriate list of affected statutes would be published if and when
the proposed rules are adopted.' It might also be desirable to add a
rule indicating the scope of the proposed rules and to promulgate an
appendix of forms similar to the forms officially issued with the federal
rules.
In the discussion below each rule is first set out to indicate the text
of the similar federal rule as well as the text of the proposed rule. For
the text of the federal rule, read the rule with matter in brackets, omit-
ting matter in italics. For the text of the rule published by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, read the text with matter in italics, omitting
matter in brackets.
Federal Rules 1 through 6
Various Washington pre-trial procedures would remain unchanged
by virtue of the omission of federal rules 1 through 6 from the recom-
mended proposal. Federal rule 4 governs the issuance, service and re-
turn of summons. These matters would not be affected, and present
methods of commencement of suit would be unchanged. Federal rules
5 and 6 are concerned with methods and times of service and filing of
pleadings and motions. In general, the present methods and times of
8 Green, Procedural Progress in Washingtom, 26 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 112 (1951).
0 Rule 65, Rules of Appeal, 34A Wn.2d.; Rule 44, Rules of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure, 34A Wn2d.
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service of papers in actions would continue under the recommended
rules unless a particular rule contains some provision to the contrary.
Are there any detailed provisions in the proposed rules which would
be inconsistent or unworkable with the present Washington methods
of commencement of suit and methods of service and filing papers in
a suit? Problems which might arise along these lines are mentioned
below in connection with the particular rule involved, but it appears
no serious difficulties would be encountered. If none would arise then
the omission of rules 1 to 6 is not of great consequence in the adoption
of the federal rules concerning pleading and parties. The principal
rules embodying the heart of the federal system are those which have
been recommended. If some difficulty has been overlooked in this
respect, consideration could be given to adding the appropriate federal
rule to the recommended proposal or changing the appropriate pro-
posed rule.
Proposed Rule 7
(a) Pleading. There shall be a complaint and an answer; and there
shall be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party com-
plaint, if leave is given under Rule 14 to summon a person who was not
an original party; and there shall be a third-party answer, if a third-
party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b) Motions and other papers.
(1) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing,
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth
the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the
motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(2) The rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of
form of pleadings apply to all motions and other papers provided for
by these rules.
(c) Demurrers, Pleas, Etc., Abolished. Demurrers, pleas and
exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be used.
Proposed rule 7 should be read with proposed rules 8 and 12. To-
gether with these rules it is basic in the federal system of pleading. In
most states in which it has been adopted, federal rule 7 has not been
changed.
Replies. Rule 7 designates the only pleadings permitted under the
proposed rules. Such pleadings would ordinarily consist of a complaint
[AUTUMN
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and an answer."0 A reply is required only when there is a counterclaim
denominated as such, or when it is ordered by the court in case there
is no such counterclaim." The plaintiff is favored by this rule since
he need not guess whether the answer contains a counterclaim requiring
a reply.
When there is no counterclaim denominated as such, the plaintiff or
the defendant can move for a reply." Of course, if one is ordered it
must be served; but if no reply is ordered, affirmative defenses in the
answer are deemed denied or avoided." Unauthorized replies can be
disregarded, stricken on motion, or treated as amendments to the
complaint."
The theory of this portion of the rule is that the complaint and
answer usually are sufficient to give notice of plaintiff's claims and
defendant's defenses. If the court feels it would be helpful for plaintiff
to reply to affirmative defenses, the court, on application, may order
a reply." It has been said that in practice under federal rule 7, the
parties do not often request a reply.'"
In effect, the rule is a compromise between two different code plead-
ing rules. In a few states no reply is allowed at all; in most, a reply to
affirmative defenses is necessary.
10 Of course, in multiple party suits, the rule also requires an answer to a cross-claim
made pursuant to rule 13 and to a third-party complaint made pursuant to rule 14.
11 In rule 13 permissive counterclaims are broadly defined to include set-offs, counter-
claims and cross-complaints as known in Washington practice. In multiple party suits,
a counterclaim may be made or may be required in an answer to a cross-claim under
rule 13. If one is had, a reply to the counterclaim is required by rule 7(a). Also, a
third-party answer to a third-party complaint under rule 14 may contain a counter-
claim. If it does, rule 7(a) seems to indicate that a reply is not required but no case
authority to support this conclusion has been discovered.
12 The defendant would ordinarily be the party desiring a reply. However, plaintiff
should obtain leave to reply if he desires to do so. See Beckstrom v. Coastwise Line,
13 F.R.D. 480 (D.C. Alaska, 1953), and cases cited therein. But in Leimer v. State
Mutual Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Mo. 1940), appeal dismissed, 127 F.2d
862 (8th Cir. 1942), the court said it did not seem necessary for plaintiff to obtain
leave to reply.
13 This conclusion follows from the provision of rule 8 (c) which states, "averments
in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken
as denied or avoided."
141 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 403 (1950).
15 The rule grants the court discretion to order a reply to any kind of a defense, but
some good reason must be advanced to obtain such an order. Such a reason might be
that the complaint and an answer which contains new matter do not cover the issues in
the case. For example, see Bankers Bond and Mortgage Co., 3 F.R. Serv. 7a. 222,
Case 1, 1 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1940). But in what may have been such a case the
court refused to permit a reply. Bickart v. Union Barge Line Corp., 10 F.R. Serv. 7a.
222, Case 1, 6 F.R.D. 579 (W.D. Pa., 1947). The availability and expense of discovery
procedures is suggested as a factor for the court to consider in The Permissive Reply,
5 F.R. Serv. 803 (1942).
16 HOLTZOFF, NEw FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 22 (1940) ; 2 MooRE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, 1508 (2nd ed. 1948).
17 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 688-689 (2d ed. 1947).
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Obviously, the above rules are different from present Washington
procedure, which contemplates a reply to affirmative defenses in the
answer as a matter of course and provides for a penalty upon failure
to reply to a good defense when it is required. 8
Under our present law it is not clear whether the plaintiff must
analyze an answer at his peril to determine whether it contains a real
counterclaim to which there should be a response. 9 As a practical mat-
ter, however, counterclaims, set-offs, or cross-complaints are now usu-
ally labeled. Also, counterclaims should demand affirmative relief if
any is to be granted by the court.20 As a result, there is usually little
question as to whether matter in the answer constitutes an affirmative
demand against plaintiff which requires some response to the answer.
If there is any question, plaintiff probably will not suffer greatly should
he reply or answer.
Several Washington statutes may authorize pleadings other than
those mentioned in the proposed rules. These statutes include those
dealing with judgment by confession, enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, agreed cases, and assessment of damages without answer.2 If
the supreme court were to list the statutes abrogated by the proposed
rules, it could then deal with these statutes. It seems logical to consider
the above-mentioned statutes and procedures as supplementary to the
proposed rules. Under such a view they would not be abrogated.
Motions. Rule 7 (b) does not make any sweeping changes in motion
practices in Washington.
In specifying that all motions except those made at a hearing or trial
be in writing, it spells out a rule which can be inferred from the lan-
guage of rule 1 of the General Rules of the Superior Courts.22 It is in
18 RCW 4.32.210 and RCW 4.56.180 (provides for judgment for failure to plead
to new matter).
19No decision has been discovered which covers the necessity for answer should
there be a counterclaim or cross-complaint wrongly labeled or indicated as such. There
may arise a problem of whether matter in the answer is merely an affirmative defense
or whether it constitutes a good counterclaim or cross-complaint. See for example
Chandler v. Miller, 172 Wash. 252, 19 P.2d 1108 (1933).
20 Gudmundsen v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co., 138 Wash. 355, 244 Pac. 676
(1926).
21 RCW 4.60 (judgment by confession) ; RCW 6.36 (enforcement of foreign judg-
ments) ; RCW 4.52 (agreed cases) ; RCW 4.28.290 (assessment of damages without
answer).
22 The rule states:
(1) All pleadings shall be plainly written or printed and paged. Each cause
of action, defense, reply, or counterclaim shall be plainly and separately stated
and consecutively numbered, and shall be divided into paragraphs according
to the subject matter, and each paragraph shall be numbered consecutively.
Copies of any pleading shall conform in paragraphing and numbering to the
original. Copies of all motions, demurrers, and pleadings, except complaints,
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accord with what appears to be the present general practice. If a prac-
tice of making oral motions other than at a hearing or trial exists in
any locality, rule 7 (b) would make a change. Since the proposed rule
also requires written motions to contain the grounds for the motions,
a probable reason for a court's actions on all motions not made at a
hearing or trial would be indicated in the record.
Under the proposed rule a motion procedure should be used in situ-
ations in which it might otherwise be assumed that orders to show
cause are to be used. Several federal cases have stated that a motion
procedure should be substituted for an order to show cause procedure.23
Nevertheless, an order to show cause has been treated in federal court
as a motion.24 The change involved would be primarily mechanical.
Among the requirements for motions stated in the rule is the above-
mentioned provision that the motion state the grounds therefor with
particularity. No great particularity as to statement of grounds is actu-
ally necessary. Thus, a motion form promulgated with the federal rules
provides for statement of grounds of a motion to dismiss in these words:
[The defendant moves] "To dismiss the action because the complaint
fails to state a claim against defendant upon which relief can be
granted."25 The remainder of the form stating other grounds is set
forth in the footnote.26 It is contemplated that the motion include the
general reason for the motion.
must be served on the opposite party, or his attorney, unless such service is
expressly waived in writing. At the trial of any issue of law or fact, or upon
the hearing of any motion, the files shall be for the use of the court, except
as to affidavits and exhibits.
(2) Pleadings in all cases must be filed on or before the time fixed by the
notice of the adverse party for the hearing of any motion or demurrer ad-
dressed thereto. The party whose pleading is not filed within such time may be
adjudged in default. (General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34 A Wn. 2d.)
In Hammond-Knowlton v. Hartford Connecticut Trust Co., 26 F. Supp. 292 (C.D.
Conn. 1939), the court said that under the federal rule oral argument on a motion is
not a "hearing" at which another motion can be made orally.
2 In Walling v. Moore Milling Co., 62 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. Va. 1945), the court
stated that it should not have allowed a show cause order procedure to be substituted
for a motion procedure when plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction. See also, Appli-
cation of Tracy, 106 F2d 96 (2d Cir. 1939).24 Bankers Bond and Mortgage Co. v. Witherow, 3 F.R. Serv. 7a. 1 F.R.D. 197,
222 (E.D. Pa. 1940).2 5 Federal Rules, Appendix of Forms, Form 19.
262. To dismiss the action or in lieu thereof to quash the return of service of
summons on the grounds (a) that the defendant is a corporation organized under
the laws of Delaware and was not and is not subject to service of process within
the Southern District of New York, and (b) that the defendant has not been
properly served with process in this action, all of which more clearly appears in
the affidavits of M. N. and X. Y. hereto annexed as Exhibit A and Exhibit B
respectively.
3. To dismiss the action on the ground that it is in the wrong district because
(a) the jurisdiction of this court is invoked solely on the ground that the action
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and (b) the defend-
1957]
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No important change in Washington practice is indicated by the
above requirement. At present the only similar state-wide provision is
rule 6 (1) of the General Rules of the Superior Courts, which requires
that the grounds of a motion be stated only when it is supported by
affidavits or other papers."7 But it is not uncommon at present to state
the grounds for a motion to the extent required by proposed rule 7(b).
The sentence in part (b) (1) which refers to "written notice of the
hearing of motion" might possibly be deleted since a notice of hearing
of motion containing the motion would be a new form. However, the
present practice concerning service of documents termed "motions"
and noting them for hearing would not be affected even if this deletion
were not made.
Abolition of Demurrers, Pleas, Etc. At first glance rule 7(c) is
startling because it states that demurrers are abolished. But this state-
ment is not as sweeping as it first appears. The objectives which can
be gained by demurrer under present Washington rules could be at-
tained in part by motion or answer under proposed rule 12. If a
party demurred under the proposed rules by mistake, the court would
have support to treat the demurrer as a motion to dismiss under rule
12.2 Abolition of the demurrer will be discussed further in connection
with rule 12.
Proposed Rule 8
GENEAL RuLEs oF PLEADiNG
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall contain [(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of juris-
diction to support it, (2) ] (1) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and [(3)] (2) a demand
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party- shall state in short and
ant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware and is
an inhabitant thereof.
4. To dismiss the action on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction because
the amount actually in controversy is less than three thousand dollars exclusive
of interest and costs. (Appendix of Forms, Form 19.)27 Rule 6, Rules of Pleading Practice and Procedure, 34A Wn.2d.
28 State of Missouri ex. rel. DeVault v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 107 F.2d 343 (8th
Cir., 1939). But a demurrer was stricken in Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. Traders & Gen-
eral Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Okla. 1941).
[AUTUMN
PROPOSED RULES
plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny
the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials
shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader
intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an aver-
ment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs,
or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so
intend to controvert all its averments, [including averments of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends,] he may do so by
general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading,
a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim
as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the
pleading as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which
a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of
damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading To Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are
made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would
be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of
one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency
and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleading. All pleadings shall be so construed
as to do substantial justice.
Federal rule 8 does not "do away with pleadings" as it sometimes
charged. But it would make important changes in the present rules gov-
19571
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erning the adequacy of pleadings (principally the complaint, cross-
claims, third-party claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses in
the answer).
Statements of Ultimate Fact, Evidential Fact, and Conclusions
of Law. Of course the Washington statute contains the usual rule of
code pleading that the complaint must contain "a plain and concise
statement of facts constituting the cause of action, without unnecessary
repetition."29 The intent of the framers of the original New York code
in requiring a statement of facts is not absolutely clear .-" It was appar-
ently intended that the complaint state a somewhat detailed summary
of the event or transaction which was the subject of the suit. This was
the great reform of code pleading-fact pleading rather than common
law issue pleading. After the adoption of the first code the courts
attempted to carry out what they conceived to be the original intent;
through the cases there was developed our present concept that the
complaint be stated in terms of "ultimate facts. 31
The declaration, common law counterpart of the complaint, was not
to state detailed facts." In part on the basis of this common law back-
ground the courts developed the idea that the complaint should not
state "evidential facts".83 The statements of "facts" in the complaint
should not be statements of details and evidence. Rather, they should
be more generalized statements which cover or "blanket" the details
of the actual subject matter of the suit. They are to bring out these
generalized facts necessary for recovery in the light of the pleader's
ideas of the applicable rules of law.
But also, because the code provided that the complaint was to state
"facts", it was logical to think that it should not contain "conclusions
of law". Such conclusions should be made by the court, not the pleader.
Thus, in states which follow the code pleading system, courts on ap-
peal and trial courts have insisted that there is a logical difference
between statements of ultimate fact, statements of evidential fact, and
29 RCW 4.32.040.
8o "In place of the system which we have thus explained [the common law system]
.... We propose, that the plaintiff shall state his case according to the facts." First
Report of the Comnissioners on Practice and Pleading, New York, 141 (1848). The
report criticizes common law pleadings for stating "the conclusions of fact, instead of
the facts themselves."
8" CLARic, CODE PLEADING 225 (1947)
32 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 12-13 (1947).
33 PomERoY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS 561 et. seq. (1876). A leading case
is Crane v. Ryder, 12 N.Y. 433 (1855). In stating the idea that ultimate facts must be
pleaded, the opinion relies on CHiTTY, PLEADING, which concerned common law
pleading.
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statements of conclusions of law. This insistence has resulted in techni-
cal distinctions between statements where often no substantial distinc-
tions seem to exist.34
In Washington the supreme court has not insisted on a rigid distinc-
tion between the types of statements mentioned in considering whether
a complaint would withstand a demurrer on the ground that it did not
state facts constituting a cause of action. According to a number of
opinions the supreme court will construe "even inferences from aver-
ments amounting to mere conclusions of law . . . in favor of the
pleader."" The court has stated the rule in these terms:
Where substantial facts constituting a cause of action are stated in
the complaint or can reasonably be inferred from the matters set forth
therein, although the allegations of such facts are in effect conclusions
of law, or are otherwise imperfect, incomplete, or defective, the in-
sufficiency pertaining to the form rather than to the substance of the
pleading, the proper mode of correction is not by demurrer nor by
excluding evidence at the trial, but by motion before trial to make the
averments more definite and certain by amendment.",
The court has also said that although the insertion of evidentiary
matter in a complaint is bad practice and evidentiary matter can be
stricken from the complaint, such insertion is not "such a vice as to call
for a reversal of judgment."37
A review of a large number of appeal opinions indicates that in
deciding whether a cause of action is stated in the complaint, the
supreme court has been quite liberal in making inferences from com-
plaints regardless of whether pertinent allegations of the complaints
could be considered conclusions of law or statements of evidential
facts. 8
84 Appeal courts of different states have also disagreed as to particular statements.
See examples in CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 229-230 (2nd ed. 1947). Compare examples
in 1 BANCROFT, CODE PLEADING (1926) at pages 56 and 106-117. See Cook, Statements
of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1921), for a clear challenge
to the idea that there is a logical distinction between statements of ultimate facts, state-
ments of evidential facts and statements of conclusions of law.
35 McMahan v. Mutual Health & Accident Association, 28 Wn.2d 202, 182 P.2d 4(1947).
so McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947).
37 Leavenworth v. Brandon, 76 Wash. 394, 136 Pac. 375 (1913).
38 A broad statement is made in a recent per curiam opinion in Wockner v. King,
48 Wn.2d 83, 291 P.2d 649 (1955). The court said,
The Washington rule is that a complaint is not demurrable where facts sub-
stantially constituting a cause of action are alleged or are reasonably inferable
from the language used. Allegations of ultimate facts and conclusions of law are
good against a general demurrer. Objections to the form rather than the substance
of the pleadings must be interposed by motion to make the averment more definite
and certain.
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Nevertheless, opinions have mentioned the necessity of pleading in
terms of ultimate facts. The court has upheld trial court decisions sus-
taining demurers to complaints in which an essential element of a cause
of action was stated in terms of a conclusion of law. 9 It is obvious,
too, that a motion to make definite and certain will lie to such allega-
tions."
Distinctions between statements of ultimate facts, statements of
evidential facts, and statements of conclusions of law are often made
at the trial court level in any event.
This general situation should be compared with that contemplated
under proposed rule 8. Subdivision (a) does away with technical dis-
tinctions between ultimate fact statements, evidential fact statements,
and statements of conclusions of law. A pleading would not be declared
insufficient to state a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief because some
essential statement in the complaint was not technically a statement
of ultimate fact. Allegations in a complaint which are conclusions of
law or statements of evidential fact would not be considered insufficient
merely because they were allegations of that nature."
The above results are intended by the language of the rule that a
"short and plain statement of a claim" should be made. The forms
promulgated with the federal rules give examples of what is considered
desirable. In the official federal negligence case form (Form 9) the
principal allegations of negligence are merely these: "On June 1, 1936,
in a public highway called Boyleston Street in Boston, Massachusetts,
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was
then crossing said highway." A paragraph concerning resulting injuries
and damage follows.4 2
Even under Washington law it is arguable that this complaint is good
89 When it was alleged that the accident which was the subject of the suit was the
direct and proximate result of defendant's alleged negligence, the court held that a
demurrer did not admit this conclusion of law and that the complaint was defective be-
cause the other allegations indicated that defendant's acts were not the proximate or
legal cause of the accident. Cook v. Seidenverg, 36 Wn.2d 256, 217 P.2d 799 (1950).
Where other allegations did not show a joint venture necessary for a cause of action
to exist, a bare allegation that there was such a joint venture was held to add nothing
to the complaint. Moen v. Zurich Gen. Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 3 Wn.2d 347,
101 P.2d 323 (1940). As indicated by a dissent, there was difficulty in applying this
rule to a complaint in State ex. rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wn.2d 367, 274 P.2d 852
(1954). If the conclusion is expressly drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint
it should be disregarded. Hamp v. Universal Auto Co., 173 Wash. 585, 24 P.2d 77
(1933).
40 Wockner v. King, supra, note 38.
41 Although allegations are not to be stricken because they are conclusions of law,
the complaint must give the defendant adequate notice of plaintiff's claim, and it is
possible that in particular complaints statements of conclusions of law will not do so.
42 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix of Forms, Form 9.
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against a demurrer, although it certainly does not correspond to com-
plaints which lawyers would now file in such a case. Our court has held
a similar general allegation of negligence good against demurrer.43
The approved federal form of complaint on a promissory note is
simplified by the statement that the defendant owes plaintiff the
amount sued for.44 This statement that the defendant owes plaintiff
the amount of the note is substituted for the more usual allegations in
complaints under the codes that the principal and interest has not been
paid and that it is unpaid. The official federal form for a suit on an
account is likewise simplified by a statement that the defendant owes
plaintiff."
By abolishing the distinction mentioned, the proposed rule would
thus allow more generality of statement than is allowed under the pres-
ent pleading rules. But the statements in the complaint could not be so
broad that the defendant would not be informed of the subject of
plaintiff's claim against him.4"
On the other hand, inclusion of evidential facts in stating the claim
would not make the complaint insufficient as a technical matter. Never-
theless, the complaint would have to be plain and concise in stating
the claim; inclusion of too many details might make the complaint
subject to a motion to strike such details.4 7
43 McLeod v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry., 65 Wash. 62, 117 Pac. 749 (1911). In this
personal injury suit of an employee against an employer the following part of the com-
plaint, which alleged the employment, the negligence, and the injury, was held good
against demurrer:
That on July 6th, 1909, plaintiff was employed by defendant as a carpenter, and
was engaged in his said work for defendant on a slip at Ballard, Washington, and
while the plaintiff was so engaged in his said work, the said defendant so care-
lessly and negligently conducted and operated the building of said slip so as to
cause a plank or timber to fall from the top of said slip down to and on the
plaintiff, striking the right hand of the plaintiff and greatly damaging and injuring
the same.44 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix of Forms, Form 3. Omitting the
paragraph dealing with jurisdiction and the prayer for relief, the form read as follows:
2. Defendant on or about June 1, 1935, executed and delivered to plaintiff a
promissory note [in the following words and figures: (here set out the note ver-
batim) ] ; [a copy of which is hereto annexed as Exhibit A]; [whereby defendant
promised to pay to plaintiff or order on June 1, 1936 the sum of ten thousand
dollars with interest thereon at the rate of six percent per annum].
3. Defendant owes to plaintiff the amount of said note and interest.
45 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix of Forms, Form 4. The form reads
as follows:
1. Allegation of jurisdiction.
2. Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars according to the account
hereto annexed as Exhibit A.
Wherefore (etc. as in Form 3).
40The claim must be identified sufficiently to distinguish it from other possible
claims by the statement of circumstances concerning the event, occurrence, or subject
matter of the claim. Footnotes 7, 44 and 45, supra.
47 See discussion of the motion to strike, infra.
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Thus, the general change in the present practice would be that com-
plaints containing statements of conclusions of law or statements of
evidential facts would be judged more liberally by the court. Com-
plaints which rely on conclusions of law or statements of evidential fact
would more likely withstand a motion to dismiss-the substitute for
our demurrer. Conclusions of law would not usually be stricken on
motion. Evidential facts would not be stricken on motion merely be-
cause they would have been considered such under our present rules.
It is still true, however, that a good complaint in terms of ultimate
facts under our present practice would undoubtedly be a good com-
plaint under the proposed rules. The official federal form specifically
authorizes general allegations of negligence, but it is the practice in
some federal courts for attorneys to file complaints containing specific
allegations of negligence."s As Judge Charles E. Clark stated the mat-
ter at a panel discussion when asked whether pleading ultimate facts
was to be perpetuated under the federal rules,
Not in any sense of making the judge formally decide that the pleading
states only ultimate facts and that everything else is erroneous. In the
sense that good pleading would call for you to state those more general
facts, yes. Perhaps I might say that the idea is still continued as an
idea of worthwhile pleading, but not as a strict rule for which you
should be hung, drawn and crucified when you don't follow it.49
Statement of a Claim. Under present rules the complaint must
state facts constituting the "cause of action", whereas under rule 8
the complaint must state a "claim" entitling the plaintiff to relief. What
is the effect of this change in language of the governing rule? In a
general way, the language of the rule, "statement of a claim", involves
the same concept as the code language, "cause of action". Present code
pleading rules demand that the complaint must include facts which,
under the applicable substantive law, will indicate that the plaintiff
has a right as to the defendant and the defendant has a duty as to the
plaintiff, and that the defendant has breached his duty." Obviously,
under this concept in a negligence case, the complaint must allege facts
showing plaintiff's duty, his negligent act, and the proximate causation
of injury by defendant's acts.
One of the principal effects of abandoning the term, "cause of
action", is that facts which show the existence of all the elements neces-
4 s2 BENDER, FEDERAL PRAcTicE FORMS 2 (1956).
49 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar Associa-
tion Institute, Cleveland 231 (1938).
50 PomERoY, CODE REmD E 519 (5th ed. 1929).
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sary for recovery need not be stated. But a complete abandonment of
the "cause of action" concept would not result, for under the rule the
complaint still must state a claim which entitles the plaintiff to relief.
A motion to dismiss the complaint made under rule 12 on the ground
that the complaint does not state a claim which entitles the plaintiff to
relief raises the basic question whether under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim the complaint states a claim
entitling plaintiff to relief." To this extent the complaint would still
contain statements which show that the plaintiff has a "cause of action"
in the sense in which that term is presently used.
In view of this test for the complaint, it would be proper and desir-
able for a complaint to be drafted in the light of legal theories.2 A
complaint cannot be drafted very successfully under code pleading
rules if the drafter does not have in mind some legal theory under which
the facts he alleges will give the plaintiff a right to recover. The same
situation would exist under proposed rule 8. If the drafter of the com-
plaint under the federal rules has no legal theory or theories in mind
when he attempts to state the claim of plaintiff, it is mere accident if
the complaint states a claim which will entitle the plaintiff to relief."
Therefore, under rule 8 statements of the claims should reflect legal
theory, just as complaints now should.",
Perhaps the most convenient method of ascertaining what is desir-
able would be to glance at the various form books cited for use under
the federal rules. The forms for complaints recommended for federal
cases do not appear greatly different, by and large, from similar com-
plaints which should be used in code pleading.
To summarize, the overall change that would be made by rule 8 (a)
is a change in the direction of less technicality in the drafting and in
the judging of complaints. Generality in complaints is authorized. The
complaint and the answer would not be designed particularly to make
specific and detailed issues of fact. The chief function of these plead-
51 See discussion of motion to dismiss, infra.
52 The official federal forms and the forms suggested in unofficial form books for
federal practice clearly reflect legal theories.
53 In a famous case plaintiff, with "limited ability to write and speak English"
served a complaint "obviously home drawn" in which he detailed grievances against
the Collector of Customs at the Port of New York. The court on appeal concluded that
the complaint showed a claim of conversion and a second violation of a legal duty by
the defendant and reversed a dismissal of the complaint. Although the complaint appar-
ently did not state ultimate facts as required in code pleading, and was in the nature
of an inartistic recital of some events, the court resorted to applicable law to ascertain
whether a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief was stated. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774 (2d cir. 1944).
54 2 MooRE, Fnmuat PRAc'rcE 1656-1658 (2d ed. 1948).
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ings would be to give fair notice to the opponent, to indicate the res
judicata effect of any judgment in the case, and to indicate the general
issues. The discussion of the motion to make definite and certain under
rule 12 is closely related to this matter.
Prayer for Relief. The proposed rule states that the prayer for
relief is not determinative of the relief which the court is authorized to
grant. No holding or holdings completely cover this matter in our state,
but in some cases this rule is mentioned.5 Most complaints are now
drafted to include a general prayer for relief. Such prayers will justify
a judgment (other than a default judgment) in accordance with facts
alleged in the complaint and the evidence."a
The proposed rule does not authorize default judgments beyond the
relief sought in the complaint." This result would be similar to the
present Washington rule.5"
Not only the complaint, but also counterclaims under rule 13,
cross-claims under rule 13, and third-party claims under rule 14, are
governed by rule 8(a). In addition, the principles for stating a claim
presumably govern the statement of an affirmative defense in the
answer.
Changes in the federal rule. The deletions from the federal rule
in paragraphs (a) and (b) of proposed rule 8 are provisions relating
to practice in federal courts. Express allegations showing jurisdiction
(usually on the basis of diversity of citizenship or on the basis that
a federal question exists) are required in federal court. Such allegations
are not necessary in our superior courts.
Defenses; Form of Denials. No sweeping changes in the present
rules governing denials in answers are contemplated by proposed
55 See for example Colvin v. Clark 83 Wash. 376, 145 Pac. 419 (1915); Dale v.
Cohn, 14 Wn.2d 214, 127 P.2d 412 (1942) ; Prichard v. Conway, 39 Wn.2d 117, 234 P.2d
872 (1951). Broad dictum can be found in many cases. The amount of damages prayed
for fixes a maximum limit of recovery. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wn.2d 282, 173
P.2d 652 (1946). The amount of attorney's fees prayed for was held to be the maximum
limit for recovery in Lundsten v. Langert, 149 Wash. Dec. 49 (1956).
56 This rule has been referred to in a number of cases on appeal. See for example,
Loutzenhiser v. Peck, 89 Wash. 435, 154 Pac. 814 (1916) ; Salt v. Anderson, 107 Wash.
149, 180 Pac. 873 (1919).
57 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 provides: "A judgment by default shall
not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for
judgment." Although this rule is not included in the proposed rule, the proposed rule
will undoubtedly be read with this restriction.
58 Relief in case of default judgments cannot exceed the relief prayed for. Ermey v.
Ermey, 18 Wn2d 544, 139 P.2d 1016 (1943) and cases cited therein; State ex rel
Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950) ; Miller v. Miller, 32
Wn.2d 438, 202 P.2d 277 (1949).
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rule 8(b). Both specific denials and general denials are permitted.
However, proposed rule 11 emphasizes the obligation of the attorney
who signs an answer containing a general denial. Under that rule he
certifies that there is good ground for such an answer to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief and that such an answer is not
interposed for delay. As is already the case in this state, denials on
information and belief are permitted. 9 Denials which amount to a
negative pregnant would probably be treated as they are now treated.0
It appears that an amendment to remedy such a defect should usually
be allowed under our present rules and similar treatment should be
anticipated under the proposed rule.
Affirmative defenses. Rule 8(c) provides that certain specific
matters be alleged as affirmative defenses. A check of Washington cases
indicates that all of the defenses listed would now probably be consid-
ered affirmative defenses in this state."'
The list of affirmative defenses in the rule is not exclusive; other
matters are required to be stated as affirmative defenses. For this pur-
pose rule 8(c) embodies the rule of code pleading that distinguishes
between matters which should be alleged affirmatively in the answer
and matters which may be proved at the trial under denials in the
answer. The factors now considered in deciding whether particular
defenses not listed in the rule are affirmative defenses for the purposes
of the answer would also be considered under the proposed rule.62 If our
150 Olsen v. Bremerton, 110 Wash. 572, 188 Pac. 772 (1920). Some of the qualifica-
tions of the present general rule are indicated in the opinion in Barber v. Grand Sum-
mitt Mining Co., 11 Wn2d 114, 118 P.2d 773 (1941). The Barber case indicates that
allegations in the complaint may be on information and belief. See Warburton v. Ralph,
9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140 (1894). A federal court has by inference approved such type
of pleading in the complaint. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Porter, 9 F.R. Serv. 8c2,
Case 1 (E.D. Pa., 1946).
61 The subject is discussed in 2 MoosE, FEDERAL PRACTicE 1682-1683 (2d ed. 1948).
In O'Brien v. Seattle Ice Co., 43 Wash. 217, 86 Pac. 399 (1906), the court said that
the common law doctrine of negative pregnant was abrogated and that "a plain and
simple construction of language based on common sense understanding has been substi-
tuted." But in Peters v. McPherson, 62 Wash. 496, 114 Pac. 188 (1911), the court
that denials must still be clear and unequivocal and should not be in a form which fails
to deny. That a liberal construction of such denials should be taken is again indicated,
however, in Nettleton v. Howe, 81 Wash. 142, 142 Pac. 450 (1914).
61 In Washington cases decisions or dicta indicate that accord and satisfaction, con-
tributory negligence, estoppel, fraud, illegality, laches, payment, release, res judicata,
waiver, statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds are matters to be pleaded affirm-
atively in the answer (unless such defenses appear on the face of the complaint and
with a few other exceptions). Cases involving the remaining listed defenses have not
been found, but they are usually considered affirmative defenses in cases decided in
other code pleading states.
2 The usual, but not invariable, test of whether particular facts should be pleaded
as an affirmative defense is whether the facts are inconsistent with, or tend to contro-
vert any of the allegations of the complaint necessary to state a cause of action-or
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court has decided that a particular matter not listed in rule 8 is an
affirmative defense to be stated in the answer, such matter would prob-
ably continue to be an affirmative defense for such purpose. In spite
of the distinction between affirmative defenses and other matter, there
is authority for a ruling that when matters which are not affirmative
defenses are pleaded affirmatively under the proposed rule, the defend-
ant will not lose such defenses.6"
It is particularly important to note that the rule affects only the
answer. It is only a pleading rule and is not intended to lay down any
rule concerning the burden of proof with respect to the listed defenses
at the trial. Present Washington law concerning burden of proof ques-
tions in connection with specific defenses would probably still control.
This result would follow from the possibility that rules governing bur-
den of proof are rules of substantive law and not matters of procedure
to be governed by court rules.
Finally, the last sentence of rule 8(c) simply indicates that a party
is not to be penalized for mislabeling an affirmative defense or a coun-
terclaim. The court should treat the matter in the answer for what is
really is.
Effect of Failure to Deny. Rule 8(d) involves no change from the
present general rule in Washington concerning the effect of failure to
deny averments when a responsive pleading is required. Such aver-
ments are admitted at present and they would be admitted under the
proposed rule.6" The second sentence of rule 8(d), and the provisions
of rule 7, indicate that if no order for a reply to an affirmative defense
is sought by either party and there is no reply, an affirmative matter
of avoidance may be brought into the case by the plaintiff. This is not
the rule in Washington." It seems possible that surprise to the defend-
ant might result in some cases, but in many instances the defendant
could avoid surprise by proper investigation of the facts and effective
use of discovery rules. In addition, if a defendant in the pleading stage
had a real question concerning the possible nature of plaintiff's posi-
tion on an affirmative defense, he could request an order for a reply
under rule 7.
in the case of the federal rule, necessary to state a claim entitling plaintiff to relief.
See Morse v. McGrady, 149 Wash. Dec. 489 (1956).
63 Best Foods, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 201 (Del. 1945) (refusing to
strike matter which could be proved under a denial but which was stated affirmatively).
64 RCW 4.36.160. (But the section does not require a response to affirmative matter
in the reply.)65 Footnote 18, supra.
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Consistency in Pleading. Rule 8(e) (2) makes some fairly im-
portant changes in the present practice.
The rule now seems to be that inconsistent causes of action cannot
be included in the same complaint. Our supreme court has been liberal
in holding that various causes of action are not inconsistent factually,
but absolute factual inconsistency between causes of action will not be
tolerated if objected to." Furthermore, if substantive law requires an
election of remedy so that causes of action are made inconsistent, it
appears that such causes cannot be included in one complaint if objec-
tion is made." Under the proposed rule factual inconsistency or incon-
sistency of legal theory would not bar the inclusion of inconsistent and
contradictory claims in one complaint."
Official federal form 10 indicates what it is possible to do. The form
contains the following allegation (plus allegations of jurisdiction and
damage). "On June 1, 1936, on a public highway called Boylston
Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant C.D. or defendant E.F.,
or both defendants C.D. and E.F., wilfully or recklessly or negligently
drove or caused to be driven a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was
then crossing said highway.""
The proposed rule cannot change substantive law governing election
of remedies, but it appears that the complaint, at least, would not be
affected by such law. If the complaint included two causes of action
between which the plaintiff must elect under rules which are regarded
as rules of substantive law, a motion to elect at the pleading stage
would probably be denied. If any election were to be required it would
probably have to come at some later stage in the proceeding."0 For as
13 Bernot v. Morrison, 81 Wash. 538, 143 Pac. 104 (1914) ; Willis T. Batchellor
Inc. v. Welden Const. Co., 9 Wn2d 392, 115 P2d 696 (1941) (dictum); Washington
Cooperative Chick Assn. v. Jacobs, 42 Wn2d 460, 256 P2d 294 (1953). Various alle-
gations involving different theories may be included. For example plaintiff may plead
facts showing liability for trespass and negligence in the same transaction and he will
not be required to elect. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Slezak, 151 Wash.
457, 276 Pac. 904 (1929). See Starwich v. Ernst, 100 Wash. 198, 170 Pac. 584 (1918)
(breach of warranty of deed and false representation as to building on land conveyed) ;
Holm v. Chicago, Al. & P.S. Ry, 59 Wash. 293, 109 Pac. 799 (1910) (express contract
and implied contract plead alternatively) ; Buckley v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insur-
ance Co., 113 Wash. 13, 192 Pac. 924 (1920) (accidental death or wrongful death in-
flicted by another).
67 No good illustrative Washington case directly holding to this effect has been dis-
covered. The statement is an inference from various cases involving election of remedies.
s BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 526-534 (1950).
60 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix of Forms, Form 20.
70 In Vern-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss Sons Textile Mills, Inc., supra note
39, the court rejected an objection to a counterclaim on the ground that it sought
rescission of a contract and also damages for breach of implied warranty, but stated
it would require defendant to elect during the trial. See also Neumann v. Bastian-
Blessing Co., 9 F.R. Serv. Sc. 611, Case 1, (N.D. Ill. 1946).
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a matter of procedure, the complaint could include inconsistent claims
regardless of the reason for their inconsistency.
The obvious purpose of the rule is to permit the pleading to cover
possible states of fact which may be shown at the trial but with respect
to which the pleader is presently uncertain. For similar reason, factu-
ally inconsistent defenses would also be permitted rather than pro-
hibited as at present.71
Generally speaking, hypothetical allegations are subject to objection
in code pleading states. 2 They are clearly allowed under the proposed
rule.
A present Washington rule would be cancelled by the second sentence
of subdivision (2), which states that a pleading is sufficient though one
of two alternative statements is not sufficient. The present Washington
rule is based in part on dry logic and to that extent seems unrealistic. "
On an overall basis would the above changes be desirable? Perhaps
the most important question is whether an opponent would be preju-
diced. It seems that the opponent would not be prejudiced unless he
could not make out the pleader's claims in view of the nature of the
alternative or hypothetical pleadings used by the pleader. Under such
circumstances the opponent could attack the pleading by motion to
make definite and certain or by motion to strike. 4 Rule 10 provides
that different claims and defenses should be stated separately and that
claims and defenses should be stated clearly and concisely. This ad-
monition of the rules can be enforced.75 Discovery devices and sum-
mary judgment procedure could also be used. Affirmatively, the rule
affords an advantage to the pleader because it enables him to cover
unforseen and unknown exigencies concerning the facts which may
arise at the trial. Harking back to the primary objective of pleadings
under all of the proposed rules, pleadings that contain permissible alle-
gations and denials under rule 8 would still give notice of the claims of
the pleader and make general issues.
Construction of Pleadings. Rule 8(f) contains a familiar liberal
construction rule. The legislature already has directed our courts to
71 The Washington rule is liberally interpreted. It has been said that the defenses
must be "utterly inconsistent," Seattle National Bank v. Carter, 13 Wash. 281 (1895),
and that one in fact must contradict the other. Dooley v. Mesher, 168 Wash. 451, 12
P.2d 406 (1932).
72 BANCROFT, CODE PLEADING 51-52 (1926).
72 The Washington rule is stated in Price v. Gabel, 162 Wash. 275, 298 Pac. 444
(1931) ; McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wn2d 864, 233 P.2d 852 (1951).
74 See discussion of Rule 12, infra.
75 See discussion of Rule 10, infra.
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take a liberal attitude under present pleading rules and the proposed
rule would direct nothing new or different. 6 The liberal attitude com-
manded has often been reflected in supreme court opinions and in
actions at the trial court level.
Proposed Rule 9
PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
(a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to
sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a repre-
sentative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, [except to the extent required to show the
jurisdiction of the court]. When a party desires to raise an issue as to
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be
sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall in-
clude such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's
knowledge.
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other con-
dition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions Precedent. In pleading the performance or occur-
rence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial
of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with par-
ticularity.
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or
official act it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the
act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic
or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or
officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting
forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it.
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of
a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be con-
sidered like all other averments of material matter.
(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are claimed,
they shall be specifically stated.
Rule 9 is less important than rules 7, 8 and 12. Apparently the fram-
ers of the rule felt that the pleading of the special matters listed had
previously caused difficulties in the federal courts and could be clarified
in connection with the present federal pleading system. Recognizing
the desirability of having these matters dealt with specifically, all of
76 RCW 4.36.050.
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the states which have adopted the federal rules have adopted rule 9
with the change indicated in the quotation above or with paragraphs
indicating how additional specific matters should be pleaded.
The clause deleted from the federal rule is related to the require-
ments of federal rule 8(a) that there be special allegations to show
jurisdiction of the federal court. As previously stated, proposed rule
8(a) properly deletes such a requirement."
Capacity. Rule 9(a) eliminates the necessity for averments of
capacity of the plaintiff to sue or the defendant to be sued. The central
theory in support of such rule is that capacity is not a real issue in
many suits, and that allegations necessary to show capacity to sue or
be sued are often merely formal.' Pleadings are simplified and issues
of capacity are made only in cases in which capacity is actually a mat-
ter of contention. In such cases the defendant is to raise it as a matter
of defense.
The rule applies strictly to matters of capacity such as corporate
existence and representative capacity. It should be noted, however, that
it refers to "averments", and that it does not refer to the caption of a
pleading. Thus, in the case of a corporation, there need be no averment
of the organization and existence of the corporation, but the caption
should contain the corporate name. Or in the case of suit by or against
a representative, there need be no averment of the authority to act in
such a capacity, but the fact that the suit involves such a party should
be indicated in the caption." In this connection it should be added that
the rule is not intended to affect allegations of representation in a class
suit.s0
The rule goes on to state that the issue of capacity shall be raised
by answer. Nevertheless, an issue of capacity has been raised by mo-
tion to dismiss under federal rule 12." Practically speaking, there may
77 See discussion of rule 8(a), supra.
78 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar Associa-
tion Institute, Cleveland 234 (1938) ; 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACnCE 1903 (2d ed. 1948).
79 This matter is discussed in further detail in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRActicE 1903-1906
(2d ed. 1948).
80 The complaint should indicate when a class suit is brought within proposed rule
23. See discussion of rule 23 in the next issue of the review.
81 Banks v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 4 F.R.D. 179 (W.D. Mo. 1944).
Cases which are contra include Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 18 F. R.
Serv. 12b.334, Case 1, 14 F.R.D. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1953) (motion to dismiss); Waldrip
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 15 F.R. Serv. 9a.4, Case 1, 11 F.R.D. 426 (W.D. La. 1951)
(motion for judgment and new trial). It has also been said that if the issue of capacity
appears on the face of the pleading (as would rarely be the case), the issue may be
raised by motion. Brusch v. Harkins, 13 F.R. Serv. 9a.4, Case 2, 9 F.R.D. 604 (W.D.
Mo. 1949).
[AUTUMN
PROPOSED RULES
be nothing wrong with such a procedure, but technically, it is not in
compliance with the wording of this rule or rule 12. That rule states
no such ground for a motion to dismiss.
A provision makes it clear that if the matter is to be pleaded in the
answer and the defendant does not have complete facts at hand, he
needn't plead a complete fact defense.
A change in Washington practice would result. No longer would
a demurrer for lack of capacity of the plaintiff be used.82 It would not
be necessary, as is now the case, to allege facts showing the capacity
of a party.83
Fraud, Mistake, Condition of Mind. Rule 9 (b) would make little
change in present Washington procedure. For example, in pleading
fraud the plaintiff now must state the fraud in terms of ultimate facts
by pleading the representations made, that they relate to material facts,
that they are false, that defendant knew they were false (if such knowl-
edge is essential in the case), that plaintiff was ignorant of their falsity
and believed them to be true, and that so believing he acted upon
them.84 The rule does not appear to contemplate a change in this method
of pleading. Usually, good pleading of fraud under our present rules
would be a good pleading of fraud under the proposed rule.85
The same conclusion should hold good as to the pleading of mistake."
Finally, under the proposed rule, malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of the mind may be averred generally. But the nature
of the present state of mind must be indicated sufficiently to show the
nature of the defense or claim related to the state of mind. At present,
the propriety of generally pleading a state of mind depends upon the
particular action.8
82 RCW 4.32.050.
83 No clear support for the idea that a representative must allege his authority or
that a corporation must allege its organization and existence has been found. However,
these requirements seem to be assumed in Harvey v. Pocock, 92 Wash. 625, 159 Pac.
771 (1916) (executrix) ; Boyer v. Robinson, 26 Wash. 117, 66 Pac. 119 (1901) (exec-
utor) ; and McKay v. Elwood, 12 Wash. 579, 41 Pac. 919 (1895).
84 Simons v. Cissna, 52 Wash. 115, 100 Pac. 200 (1909); Roser v. Moomaw, 78
Wash. 653, 139 Pac. 622 (1914).85 Ultimate, not evidential facts, should be pleaded. Brown v. Fire Assn., 3 F.R.
Serv. 12e.231, case 16, 1 F.R.D. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ; Curacao Trading Co. v. William
Stake & Co., 5 F.R Serv. 8a.26, case 1, 2 F.RD. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
802 MooRF, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1911 (1948). See form in 2 BENDER, FmERAL PRAc-
TIcE FoRms 204-205 (1956), supra note 36.
87 Under the usual code pleading rules, malice may be alleged generally. 3 BAx-
caor, CODE PLEADING 2979 (1926). It may be so pleaded in a complaint for malicious
prosecution. Jones v. Jenkins, 3 Wash. 17, 27 Pac. 1022 (1891). But to state that an
act is wilful, or intentional may be a conclusion of law. 1 BANCROFT, CODE PLEADING
107 (1926). As in fraud cases, knowledge can be alleged directly. Scribner v. Palmer,
81 Wash. 470, 142 Pac. 1166 (1914).
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Conditions Precedent. The provision that performance of condi-
tions precedent may be generally averred incorporates the present rule
in Washington as to pleading of conditions precedent in a contract
action.8 However, the rule is broader than the Washington statute
concerning contract conditions precedent because it is not limited to
contract actions in terms. This type of pleading is often convenient
and useful, and usually involves no injury or inconvenience to a de-
fendant.
As is true now, fulfillment of conditions precedent or waiver of such
conditions would usually have to be pleaded. And also as at present,
it would not be necessary to plead fulfillment of conditions subsequent.
Nor does the proposed rule affect questions of whether particular con-
ditions are conditions precedent or conditions subsequent.
The provision for a denial to raise the issue of performance of a
condition precedent is not intended to affect any rules concerning the
burden of proof at the trial. Our present statute dealing with condi-
tions precedent would not be affected insofar as it deals with this
burden. 9
Official Document or Act. Since rule 9 (d) provides that in pleading
an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document
was issued, or the act done, in compliance with law, it would not be
necessary for a pleading to state facts showing that the official act or
document was authorized. This rule does not affect proof of such acts
or documents at the trial. It does not affect judicial notice doctrines
with respect to such acts or documents. The acts of officials or docu-
ments referred to are acts or documents issued by governmental offi-
cers in their official capacity."0
The present rules and statutes governing the pleading of foreign
statutes, private statutes, municipal ordinances, and the existence of
cities or towns, would not be affected.8 1
Judgment. Rule 9(e) requires little comment for it would merely
replace and broaden RCW 4.36.150, which dispenses with the necessity
of pleading facts to show the jurisdiction of a court or officer of special
jurisdiction (in pleading a judgment). The rule would also extend the
present case law that it is not necessary to plead the facts showing
88 RCW 4.36.080.
89 Note 88, supra.901 BARRON AND HOLTZoFF, FEDER. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 553 (1950).
91 RCW 5.24.040 (foreign laws), RCW 4.36.090 (private statutes), RCW 4.36.110
(ordinances), RCW 4.36.100 (existence of towns and cities).
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jurisdiction of a foreign court of general jurisdiction when its judg-
ment is pleaded. 2 Under the proposed rule, such pleading of facts is
not necessary when the judgment of an inferior tribunal is pleaded.
Rule 9 (e) would accomplish a minor simplification in pleading with-
out sacrificing any substantial advantage the defendant now has.
Time and Place. Under proposed rule 9 (f) allegations of dates are
material. As explained in connection with proposed rule 12, some fed-
eral courts have held that a motion to dismiss may be made on the
ground that the complaint shows that the applicable statute of limita-
tion bars the suit.23 To this extent the rule would not change Washing-
ton practice, for a demurrer will now lie if it appears from the face
of the complaint that an action is barred by the statute of limitations.94
However, the rule does not mean that specific allegations of time and
place must necessarily be included in a complaint. They need not be
included if they are not necessary to state a claim and are not material
to any defense?'
It is probable that amendments could cure erroneous allegations of
time and place; and as in Washington now, variances in proof would
be immaterial if the defendant were not misled.9"
Special Damage. Proposed rule 9(g) merely adopts the general
rule in Washington. 7 Whatever special damages must now be pleaded
for recovery in this state presumably would have to be pleaded under
the proposed rule.
Proposed Rule 10
Fom OF PLEADINGS
(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading shall contain a
caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the
file number if known to the person signing it, and a designation as in
Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state
the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indica-
tion of other parties. When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the
02 Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (1900).
93 See discussion of rule 12, infra.
94 RCW 4.32.050. But the return of service may not be referred to. It is not part
of the complaint. Dolan v. Baldridge, 165 Wash. 69, 4 P2d 871 (1931).
05 Bleecker v. Drury, 7 F.R. Serv. 9§1, case 1, 3 F.R.D. 325 (W.D.N.Y. 1944).
06 Breeden v. Seattle, Renton & S. R. Co., 60 Wash. 522, 111 Pac. 771 (1910),
(place) ; Wilbert v. Sturgeon, 118 Wash. 551, 204 Pac. 185 (1922) (place).9 7 King v. King, 83 Wash. 615, 145 Pac. 971 (1915); Sudden & Christenson v.
Morse, 48 Wash. 101, 92 Pac. 901 (1907).
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defendant, it shall be so stated in his pleading, and such defendant may
be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his
true name shall be discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be
amended accordingly.
When the heirs of any deceased person are proper parties defendant
to any action relating to real property in this state, and when the names
and residences of such heirs are unknown, such heirs may be proceeded
against under the name and title of the "unknown heirs" of the de-
ceased. In any action brought to determine any adverse claim, estate,
lien, or interest in real property, or to quiet title to real property, un-
known parties shall be designated as "also all other persons or parties
unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real
estate described in the complaint herein."
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim or
defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of
which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single
set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in
all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate trans-
action or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated
in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear
presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. Statements in a pleading
may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or
in another pleading or in any motion. A copy of any written instrument
which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
Caption and Names of Parties. A few changes have been made in
the federal rule from which proposed rule 10(a) was taken. In the first
sentence a provision, "if known to the person signing it", has been
added. This is a very minor change. Because the complaint is filed with
the clerk at the commencement of the suit under the federal rules, it
may originally be assigned a file number. In Washington it is possible
that pleadings may not be filed until after the suit is at issue, and con-
sequently it is desirable to qualify the requirement that every pleading
shall contain the file number.
The last sentence and the second paragraph of the proposed rule
have also been added to the federal rule. These provisions were copied
from RCW 4.36.230, 4.28.130 and 4.28.150, which do not make it
necessary to state the actual names of the parties under the outlined
circumstances. Similar additions have been made to this rule in a num-
ber of the states which have adopted it.
With the modifications indicated, rule 10(a) involves virtually no
changes from present practice.
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Paragraphs and Separate Statements. Copied verbatim from the
federal rule, rule 10(b) is aimed at promoting clarity of pleadings. Two
distinct requisites are set forth. First, the averments of a claim must
be paragraphed as far as practicable, each paragraph to be limited to
the statement of a set of circumstances. Second, each claim or each
defense other than a denial shall be set forth separately.
The first rule is substantially the same as the present Washington
rule which provides that each cause of action, defense, etc. shall be
divided into paragraphs according to the subject matter." Paragraph-
ing is mandatory under the proposed rule but the addition of the words,
"so far as practicable", gives some leeway to the pleader in paragraph
construction. It seems apparent that the present rule and the proposed
rule demand paragraphs based on the principles of good English com-
position.
The second rule is qualified in its requirement that claims and de-
fenses be stated in separate counts or defenses. The qualification is
accomplished by the clause that such separate statement is only re-
quired "whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the
matter set forth." To this extent the proposed rule differs from the
present rule requiring separate statement of causes of action and de-
fenses." If the claims related to different transactions, or different
plaintiffs, or different defendants, they would usually be clarified by
presentation in separate counts. Sometimes, as between the same par-
ties, however, claims which relate to the same transaction could be
included in one count at the discretion of the pleader.' In almost any
situation where there are separate claims the rule would seem to
authorize the pleader to state separate claims in separate counts if he
desired.
Separate Claims. In the discussion of rule 8(a) it has been pointed
out that the term, "claim", does not have exactly the same meaning as
the term "cause of action". There is a further difference between a
"claim" and a "cause of action" which is pertinent to this rule that
08 Rule 1, General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn2d provides that each
cause of action or defense, reply or counterclaim "shall be divided into paragraphs
according to the subject matter, and each paragraph shall be numbered consecu-
tively. ."
00 Rule 1, General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn.2d; RCW 4.32.090 (de-
fenses to be stated separately); RCW 4.36.220 (allows motion to strike when causes
of action and defenses are not pleaded separately).
100 If the complaint gives fair notice, a motion to separately state the claims involved
may be refused. Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co. 16 F.R. Serv. 10621, Case
2, 12 F.R.D. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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claims be stated separately. A cause of action for purposes of separate
statement has traditionally been defined as a right of plaintiff, the corre-
sponding duty of defendant, and the violation of such duty, when the
law is applied to the facts at hand.'' In contrast, the central idea of
the term "claim", in connection with separate statements of claim, is
the idea of the term, "transaction".1 2 From this standpoint a claim
will cover any group of facts unified in actual life. Or as it has been
otherwise stated, a claim is "an aggregate of operative facts.' 0 3 A few
random examples from federal cases illustrates this idea. Thus it has
been held that claims for negligent wrongdoing and intentional wrong-
doing arising from one event need not be separately stated.'0' A negli-
gence claim for injuries from a fall and from defendant's subsequent
failure to treat the injuries did not require separate statement of
claims. 105 On the other hand a suit for libel which also contained an
allegation of slander was said to involve two claims-the publication
of the document and the oral circulation of the same statements.108
For the purpose of separate statement and numbering of causes of
action, a cause of action does not seem to be clearly defined in the
Washington cases. In some cases it appears that a broader viewpoint
is taken than in others, but to the extent that the more traditional con-
cept of a cause of action is used, the federal rule would make a
change.'0
7
101 PomERov, CODE REmEDIES, 519-520 (5th ed. 1929).
102 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 354-396 (1948).
103 CLARc, CODE PLEADING 137-148 (2nd ed. 1947). There apparently has been diver-
gence from this concept in some federal cases.
104 Somberg v. Bluemschine, 11 F.R. Serv. 23b.3, Case 2, 8 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
105 McCormick v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 7 F.R. Serv. 10b2l, Case 1, (E.D. Pa.
1943).
106 Iseman v. Bandler, 19 F.R. Serv. 10b.l, Case 4, 16 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
107 The cases concerning the pleading of an express contract and a quasi-contract
theory for recovery are somewhat typical. In Holm v. Chicago, Milwaukee & P. S. R.,
59 Wash. 293, 109 Pac. 799 (1910), the plaintiff pleaded these grounds in one cause
of action and it was held that the trial court properly refused a motion to separate and
elect, the court stating that there was but one cause of action. But in Staples v. Esary,
130 Wash. 521, 228 Pac. 514 (1924), the court states that a plaintiff may plead two
causes of action alternately-one on the express contract and one on quantum ineruit.
That these grounds may be pleaded separately seems to be assumed in Holmes v.
Radford, 143 Wash. 644, 255 Pac. 1039 (1927). That they may be pleaded in one count
seems to be assumed in Adjustment Department, Olympia Credit Bureau v. Norman
Brostrom, 15 Wn.2d 193, 130 P.2d 67 (1942). The point was not at issue in these
latter two cases.
A somewhat liberal viewpoint of a cause of action for the purpose of separate state-
ment is taken in Lloyd v. Fidelity National Bank, 169 Wash. 107, 13 P.2d 504 (1932)
(suit in connection with usurious interest payment on several loans was treated as one
cause of action); Hutchison v. Mt. Vernon Water and Power Co., 49 Wash. 469, 95
Pac. 1023 (1908) (suit to establish water rights based on riparian ownership, appro-
priation, and contract could be stated in one count); Hurley-Mason Co. v. Pacific
Commissary Co., 111 Wash. 439, 191 Pac. 624 (1920) (the court stated that an account
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The proposed rule would not be enforced by a motion to dismiss
for failure to state claims separately. Instead, the proper motion should
seek to require separate statement of claims."' 8
Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. Rejecting the traditional objec-
tion that any adoption by reference makes a pleading incomplete and
confusing, proposed rule 10(c) enables the pleader to avoid repetition
and undue length in his pleading.
The provision for adoption by reference to other parts of the same
pleading would continue the present Washington rule that such a plead-
ing is not bad on demurrer. 09 Reference to other pleadings does not
seem to be specifically authorized by any case or rule in this state.
The authorization for making exhibits a part of a pleading would not
make much change in Washington rules. At present an instrument
which forms the basis of a suit may be attached as an exhibit and made
part of the pleading."0 No case has been found which now authorizes
other instruments which are not the basis of the complaint to be incor-
porated into the complaint by attachment as an exhibit.11" If the pleader
now attaches such instruments he may be incorporating evidential facts
in his pleading.
Proposed Rule 11
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
stated allegation and other grounds for recovery could be contained in one count);
Starwich v. Ernst, 100 Wash. 198, 170 Pac. 584 (1918) (suit for false representation
and breach of warranty of a deed relating to same transaction was said to involve one
cause of action which may be stated in one count. "In other words, separate and dis-
tinct acts, culminating in one result and giving rise to but one liability, do not require
statement in separate counts . . ."). See also Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563, 46 Pac.
1033 (1896).
In several cases the court assumed that it was proper to plead in separate counts
claims which it is arguable would constitute one cause of action under the "aggregate
of operative facts" theory. See for example, Connelly v. Malley, 106 Wash. 464, 180
Pac. 469 (1919) ; McCorkle v. Mallory, 30 Wash. 632, 71 Pac. 186 (1903) ; and Hock-
ensmith v. Ferguson, 5 Wash. 256, 98 Pac. 670 (1908).
108 Bleecker v. Drury, 7 F.R. Serv. 9§1, Case 1, 3 F.R-D. 325 (W.D.N.Y. 1944).
Generally speaking the technical form of any motion should not control the granting
of proper relief because rule 9(e) (1) provides that no technical forms of motions are
required.
100 Sly v. Palo Alto Gold Mining Co., 28 Wash. 485, 68 Pac. 871 (1902). It would
seem that the reference could be so confusing or ambiguous that the complaint would
be subject to attack.
110 Hays v. Dennis, 11 Wash. 360, 39 Pac. 658 (1895).
112 RCW 4.36.040 does not appear to authorize such an attachment. In Gregory v.
Seattle, 32 Wn.2d 836, 239 P.2d 349 (1951), the supreme court considered plaintiff's
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sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifi-
cally provided by rule [or statute], pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by an affidavit. [The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances
is abolished.] The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as
sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may
be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
The rule is self-explanatory and in the federal courts no important
difficulties have arisen as far as can be ascertained. But perhaps a few
comments are warranted. The rule is based on the premise that it is
more realistic to have the attorney certify to pleadings than it is to
have the client who is represented by an attorney swear to them."2 The
drafting of pleadings is often a technical matter; and therefore the
attorney is made responsible for them, with emphasis on his obligation
to act in good faith.
Except in the case of a flagrant violation of the rule, it does not
seem that a court should strike the pleading for lack of compliance and
proceed as though there had been no pleading. A client might be penal-
ized without sufficient warrant should such action be taken."' If a
party is not represented by counsel, however, this is the only method
for enforcement.
The rule applies to motions as well as pleadings.'"
Our present general requirements for verification of pleadings would
be abrogated." 5 This result is emphasized by the fact that the federal
rule is changed by deletion of the provision for verification if verifica-
tion is required by statute. This deletion seems a necessary revision to
make clear that the proposed rule would replace our general statutes
appeal from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to
the complaint. In deciding whether the complaint stated a cause of action, the court
took into account two photographs which were attached to and made a part of the
complaint.
112 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of Institutes, Washington and
New York 52 (1939).
I' The court may grant leave to sign an unsigned pleading. Universal Laboratories,
Inc. v. V. Vivandau, Inc. 8 F.R. Serv. 11.51, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
11" Proposed rule 7(a) (2).
115 RCW 4.36.010, RCW 4.36.020, and RCW 4.36.030.
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requiring verification of pleadings."16 Complaints which accompany ap-
plications for restraining orders would not have to be verified. 17 Unless
a contrary rule defining the scope of the proposed rules is added, it
appears that the signing of confessions of judgment under RCW 4.60
would not be affected, nor would there be any effect on the requirement
for a verified petition mentioned in RCW 6.36.030 in connection with
registration of foreign judgments.
Proposed Rule 12
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS-WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED-
By PLEADING OR MOTION-MOTION FOR JUDGM ENT ON PLEADINGS
(Subdivisions are reproduced below)
General Summary. Rule 12 is designed to afford the defendant a
simple method of pleading his defenses. Yet it should insure notice of
defenses to the plaintiff. These objectives are promoted by the provi-
sions that all defenses can be made by the answer and that such de-
fenses may be inconsistent. But it is recognized that certain defenses
are fairly and conveniently raised by motion, and those defenses are
listed in the rule. Except for the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the defense of failure of a complaint to state a
claim entitling the plaintiff to relief, and the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, all of the listed defenses not made by the desig-
nated motions or by the answer are waived as explained below. In
the main, a two-stage defense is thus provided for in the pleading stage
of a suit-first, the listed motions may be used, and second, an answer
may be made. Motions to challenge jurisdiction, or preliminary motions
for change of venue, are not authorized prior to the making of other
motions under rule 12 (b).
Rules as to defenses are to apply to defenses to counterclaims and
cross-claims under rule 13 and to defenses to third-party complaints
under rule 14."1
Excluding certain preliminary motions and procedures such as spe-
cial appearances to challenge jurisdiction over the person, our present
rules generally contemplate two stages of defense-the stage of mo-
tions and demurrer, and the stage of answer.
116 Supra, note 115.
117 This change does not seem to have any important significance.
18 An excellent summary of federal rule 12 is contained in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRc-
Tics 2219-2223 (1948).
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Proposed Rule 12(a)
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his answer [within
20 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him,
unless the court directs otherwise when service of process is made
pursuant to Rule 4(e).] within the following periods: (1) within 20
days, exclusive of the day of service, after the service of the summons
and complaint upon him; (2) within 20 days, exclusive of the day of
service, after the service of the summons without the complaint upon
him, if he fails to appear within 10 days after such service of summons;
(3) within 10 days after the service of the complaint upon him or his
attorney where the defendant has appeared after service of summons
and the complaint has been served in accordance with Ren. Rev. Stat.
Section 224, R.C.W. Section 4.28.060; (4) within 60 days from the
date of first publication of the summons if the summons is served by
publication in accordance with the laws of 1953, Ch. 102, Section 1,
RCW Section 4.28.100 and Rem. Rev. Stat. Section 233, RCW Section
4.28.110; (5) within 60 days after the service of the summons upon him
if the summons is served upon him personally out of the state in accord-
ance with Ren. Rev. Stat. Section 234, R.C.W. Section 4.28.180; (6)
within the period fixed by any other applicable statutes or rules. A
party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall
serve an answer thereto within 20 days after the service upon him. The
plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 20
days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court,
within 20 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise
directs. [The United States or an officer or agency thereof shall serve
an answer to the complaint or to a cross-claim, or a reply to a counter-
claim, within 60 days after the service upon the United States attorney
of the pleading in which the claim is asserted.] The service of a motion
permitted under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless
a different time is fixed by order of the court: (1) if the court denies
the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the
court's action; (2) if the court grants a motion for a more definite
statement the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after
the service of the more definite statement.
Changes in the Federal Rule. Federal rule 4 provides for the
commencement of suit by filing a complaint with the clerk, whereupon
a summons will be issued by the clerk. Federal rule 12(a) properly
relates a twenty-day time period for answer to service of summons
under federal rule as indicated in the above quotation of the federal
rule in brackets.
But, as already pointed out, proposed rules 7 through 25 would not
change Washington methods of beginning a suit, which are different
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from the method outlined in the first part of federal rule 4.1' At the
same time, our present statutes on commencement of suit outline vari-
ous times for answer. Therefore, proposed rule 12 should continue these
present periods for answer. It does so by the changes in federal rule
12(a) italicized in the quotation above.
To accomplish such a result it appears that the proposed rule could
have stated that the defendant should serve his answer within such
times as are required by applicable rules and statutes. By such a general
wording, the times for answer or appearance in connection with present
methods for service of process would be preserved. The proposed
change, however, deals with the matter more specifically. It takes into
account in more detail the presently authorized methods of beginning
a suit in this state and should be read in connection with the applicable
statutes on that subject.
Clause (1) of proposed Rule 12(a) takes into account the present
method of commencing a suit by the service of summons and com-
plaint. "' Clauses (2) and (3) take into account the present method of
commencing a suit by service of summons without the complaint as
governed by RCW 4.28.060. Pursuant to that section a suit may be
commenced by service of summons without the complaint, provided
that the summons notifies the defendant that the complaint will be
filed within five days after service of the summons. If the defendant
appears within ten days from the date the summons alone is served
upon him, then the statute provides that plaintiff must serve a copy of
the complaint within ten days of the appearance. The defendant shall
then have ten days after service of the complaint to answer. Clause (3)
states the time for answer in this situation. If the defendant does not
appear within ten days after such service of summons, it is logical to
assume that under the statute the complaint need never be served on
the defendant, but that the suit is commenced and appearance must
be had in the regular twenty-day period (at least if the complaint has
been filed within the five day period).12 Clause (2) provides for answer
in this situation.
Our present statutes make it possible to file the complaint and then
110 See discussion of federal rules I through 6, supra.
Imo When summons and complaint are served the defendant is to appear in twenty
days. RCW 4.28.030, RCW 4.28.040, RCW 4.28.050 and RCW 4.28.060.
121 RCW 428.060. No case has been found to support the conclusion that if defend-
ant does not follow the procedure of appearance in ten days he should appear within
the regular twenty day limit (provided the complaint is filed within five days of the
service). This result may be inferred from the statute even though it is not directly
stated.
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serve summons and complaint. 2 Clause (1) of proposed Rule 12(a)
would govern. It also seems theoretically possible at present to file the
complaint and then serve the summons without the complaint, stating
either that the complaint will be fied in five days or that it has been
filed. "' In that case either clause (2) or clause (3) would seem to
govern, depending on whether defendant appeared within 10 days.
The remaining clauses as to time of answer do not need explanation.
They refer to other statutory periods of time for appearance.",
There are two important questions which arise with respect to the
clauses just discussed. Would the procedure of serving a notice of
appearance be affected by the statements in the proposed rule that the
answer shall be filed in a specified number of days? Would present
default procedures be affected?
These questions are raised by the fact that under the federal rules a
defendant is in default if he does not serve an answer (or a motion
under rule 12 which postpones answer) within the time limit specified
by the rule, unless he obtains a time extension. 2" This is not in accord
with our state procedure, under which a defendant may serve a notice
of appearance and then as a matter of right serve an answer at any
time prior to service of motion for default upon him. 2 6
The federal procedure is in part based on federal rule 6, which pro-
vides for obtaining extensions of periods of times specified in the fed-
eral rules, and in part on federal rule 55, which outlines default pro-
cedure. Because the proposed rules do not include federal rules 6 and
55 it is reasonable to conclude that proposed rule 12 is not intended
to affect default procedures now in operation. The use of a notice of
122 RCW 4.28.010 and RCW 4.28.060.
123 Statutes cited in footnote 122, supra. Mounts v. Goranson, 29 Wash. 261, 69 Pac.
740 (1902), is an inconclusive case on the point of whether the summons may state that
the complaint has been filed. The plaintiff served a summons and complaint on May 20.
The summons was quashed. Then, on June 3, plaintiff filed the complaint and on June
13 plaintiff served a summons "requiring defendants to appear and answer the com-
plaint on file in the clerk's office on or before June 20." A motion to quash was made
on the ground that no copy of the complaint was served with summons. The motion
was denied. On appeal from an adverse judgment this ruling was upheld, but the court
mentioned as a ground for its decision that the complaint had already been served (on
May 20). This was mentioned in connection with the fact that the complaint had not
been served within ten days after notice of appearance. A related case is Rauch v.
Zander, 138 Wash. 610, 245 Pac. 17 (1926).
124 Clauses (4) and (5) refer to answer when summons is served by publication or
personally on defendant out of the state. Miscellaneous times for appearance set forth
in other statutes are covered by clause (6).
72 Federal Rules 5, 6 and 55. Orange Theatre Corporation v. Rayhertz Amusement
Corp., 130 F2d 185 (3rd cir. 1942) holds that a stipulation to extend the time of
answer must be approved by the court.
126 Rule 4, General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn2d (default); See RCW
4.56.160 (default) ; RCW 4.28.210 (appearance).
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appearance in our state has several results, but it is primarily signifi-
cant in connection with default procedure; therefore, in connection
with default, the effect of serving such an appearance should remain as
it is now.
A related matter should be discussed. If a motion to dismiss on the
grounds listed in subdivision (b) is made, or if a motion under sub-
divisions (e) and (f) of rule 12 is made before answer and within the
times for answer, the making of such a motion will postpone the time
for answer as indicated in the rule. Under the federal rule, unless an
extension of time for such motions or answer is sought by defendant,
he must therefore make such motions or answer in 20 days or be in
default. However, under proposed rule 12, if no answer or motions
within the rule were filed within the applicable time limit, it would
seem that our present rules concerning default and the effect of a
notice of appearance would govern.
Other Questions with Respect to Times for Pleadings and
Motions. In specifying time periods, proposed rule 12(a) provides
for service of the answer. The other subdivisions of rule 12 refer to the
service of motions by the use of the verb, "make"."' It has also been
stated above that the proposed rules do not deal with filing of plead-
ings and motions, and therefore our present rules concerning the filing
of pleadings and motions would still be effective."' No change of prac-
tice in that respect is foreseen. If a reply is ordered to an affirmative
defense pursuant to rule 7, the time limit for the reply is twenty days
after the service of the order. A change in the present time limit would
result.'
At present, it is the general rule that the pendency of a demurrer
(which is similar to a motion to dismiss on the grounds listed in pro-
posed rule 12 (b)) or a motion to strike or a motion to make definite and
certain enlarges the time to answer (or reply) until three days after an
adverse decision, unless the court otherwise orders.' The last sentence
of rule 12(a) of the proposed rule would alter the time for answer
when motions authorized by the rule are denied by a different period
of time.
These time limit changes appear to have little significance, particu-
12 7 Thierfield v. Postman's Fifth Avenue Corporation, 37 F. Supp. 958 (D.C.S.D.
N.Y., 1941).
28 Rule1 (2),General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn. (2d) ; RCW 4.32.260.
29Rule 2, General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn. (2d).130 Rules 3 and 6, General Rules of the Superior Courts 34A Wn. (2d).
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larly when it is considered that the order of the court on a motion can
deal with the time for answer.
Proposed Rule 12(b)
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto
if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue or change of venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which
the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule [56]-, and all parties shall be given reason-
able opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule [56]-
Defense by Motion and Answer. It has been pointed out above
that the answer may contain all the defenses which defendant intends
to make, whether of fact or of law. To this extent the federal rule was
based upon English procedure which provided that all defenses be
made by answer, except certain defenses considered unusual.1 3' The
rule simply means that all defenses which are apparent on the face of
the complaint, all jurisdictional defenses including the defense that
there is lack of jurisdiction over the person, objections to venue, request
for change of venue, and any other defenses in abatement or in bar
may be raised in the answer without making any motion or appearance
prior to answer. If no motions are made prior to answer and various
defenses which could have been made by motion under the rule are
stated in the answer, these defenses may be considered before trial."2
The rule does not follow English rules which contain greater restric-
tions on defenses by motion.' The defenses listed in the rule may be
'3' The English rule is explained in 2 Moopx, FEDERAL PRACrICE 2224-2229 (1948).
132 Proposed rule 12(d).
133 Footnote 131, supra.
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raised by motion prior to the answer at the option of the defendant.
In addition, under the federal rule there is authority for making mo-
tions other than those indicated in rule 12.11" The making of such
other motions would not delay the time for answer under rule 12 (a) ."
The later discussion of rule 12 (g) and (h) indicates that a motion
to dismiss on the grounds listed in rule 12(b), and perhaps a motion
for a more definite and certain statement under Rule 12(e), and a
motion to strike under rule 12(f) cannot be made successively in
time. With the limitations indicated later in this article these motions
must be consolidated or joined. Motions not covered by rule 12 would
not be waived because such motions were not made with motions cov-
ered by rule 12.11' This matter is discussed further in connection with
rule 12(g) and (h).
How would present methods of making important types of defenses
be changed by the general method of defense through motion to dismiss
or answer which is described by the rule? The following defenses which
are raised by defects on the face of the complaint and which may now
be attacked by demurrer would be made by a motion to dismiss under
rule 12(b), or by answer: (1) that the court has not jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant, or the subject matter, (2) that there is
a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant (non-joinder), and (3) that
the complaint does not state facts constituting a cause of action (that
the claim does not entitle the plaintiff to relief under rule 8) ." These
defenses are not waived under the proposed rule if not made by motion
to dismiss or by answer."'
In the rare case in which the pendency of another suit would appear
on the face of the complaint, the defense would be made in the answer
and not by demurrer as at present."'
134 Eamples of such motions are as follows: motion for security for costs, Wheeler
v. Lientz, 25 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mo. 1939); motion for stay, Parker v. Transconti-
nental & Western Air, Inc., 8 F.R. Serv. 12e.231, Case 16, 4 F.RD. 325 (W.D.Mo.
1944).
13G Proposed rule 12(g) and (h), discussed infra.
13O Footnote 134, supra.13 7 RCW 4.32.050 (grounds of demurrer).
135 Proposed rule 12(h).
.30 See Dirk Ter Haar v. Seaboard Oil Co., 4 F.R. Serv. 12b.334, Case 1; 1 F.R.D.
598 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (perhaps the defense was not indicated in the complaint) ; Sproul
v. Gambone, 34 F. Supp. 441 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (defense not indicated in complaint).
But it has been stated that a preliminary motion to stay proceedings because of another
pending suit between the parties is proper. Green v. Gravatt, 35 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Pa.
1940). In Butler v. Judge of the United States, 116 F2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1941), the
court held that a district court could grant a motion to stay proceedings pending an
action in state court and that the matter need not be pleaded in the answer, because
the pendency of action in state court was not relied upon as a ground of abatement. It
amounted to a temporary suspension of proceedings in the federal court. A declaratory
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The two remaining present grounds for demurrer would be dealt
with as follows: The bar of the statute of limitations appearing on the
face of the complaint would be raised by motion to dismiss or by
answer.' Lack of capacity would usually have to be challenged by the
answer because no affirmative allegation of authority is required.'
Finally, defenses in bar which are not raised by defects on the face
of the complaint must now be pleaded in the answer. Such defenses
would generally be made by answer under the proposed rules. How-
ever, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be a "speak-
ing motion. 14 2 (Furthermore, some federal cases have permitted a
"speaking" motion to dismiss on the other grounds listed in rule
12(b)). 14 3
Other defenses which may now be made prior to answer would be
treated differently. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
would not be made by special appearance and motion to quash the
summons or set aside the service of summons. The present distinction
between a general appearance giving the court jurisdiction and a special
appearance to challenge jurisdiction would be abolished.'4 A defendant
who wishes to challenge the jurisdiction over his person would raise
this defense by motion to dismiss if he made a motion on any of the
other grounds listed in the rule. As an alternative, if he did not make
a motion under Rule 12, he would make the jurisdictional defense in
his answer along with all of his other defenses in the answer. If he did
not make it by motion or by answer he would waive it under the terms
of subdivisions (g) and (h). On the other hand, if he made the defense
by motion or answer with other defenses, he would not waive his
objection.""
The listing of change of venue as a defense in the rule involves an
addition to the federal rule. The reference to change of venue is not
judgment suit involves a special situation. In such a suit a motion to dismiss based
on the pendency of another suit was granted in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley,
140 F. Supp. 206 (W.D. Mich. 1956).
The cases are discussed in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2257 (1948). One opinion
states that the defense cannot be made by motion to dismiss even when the complaint
indicates the defense. Curtis v. George J. Meyer Malt & Grain Corp. 10 F.R. Serv.
12b.235, Case 1, 6 F.R.D. 444 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
141 Proposed rule 9(a).
142 See discussion of motion to dismiss on this ground, infra.
143 See extended discussion in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2247-2257 (1948).
'44 See RCW 4.28.210. The operation of the federal rule in this respect is discussed
in Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1944).
145 This result is based on the sentence of subdivision 12(b) which states, "No de-
fense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objec-
tions in a responsive pleading or motion." See discussion in 2 MoorE, FEDERAL PRAc-
TIcE 2262-2264 (1948).
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limited. It appears to cover all requests for change of venue by the
defendant, including the statutory grounds that the county designated
in the complaint is not the proper county, that there is reason to believe
that an impartial trial cannot be had therein, that the convenience of
witnesses or the ends of justice would be forwarded by the change, and
that the judge is disqualified.14
There is a question whether the procedure of motion and affidavit of
prejudice authorized by RCW 4.12.040-050 would be within the rule.
However, under these sections the objection is primarily to the judge.
Although the transfer of the case to another court may be involved,
the authorized procedure does not necessarily involve a change of court.
For this reason it appears that the affidavit of prejudice procedure
might not be affected.
The present time and method of seeking a change of venue would
be altered to some extent. The governing statute and rule now provide
that a motion for change of venue on the ground that the action is not
brought in the proper county must be made at the time the defendant
appears and demurs or answers."7 But the defendant can make such
a motion when he enters a general appearance in some other way, such
as by filing notice of appearance."" In contrast, the proposed rule con-
templates that he request change of venue when he makes any other
defenses under rule 12 by motion, or if he makes no such defenses by
motion, that he request change of venue in his answer.
If a venue requirement is jurisdictional under our present venue
statutes, as in the case of suits involving injury to real property, the
objection could also be taken by motion to dismiss under rule 12 or
146 RCW 4.12.030. Under the federal rule, which uses only the term "improper
venue", there is some authority that a motion for transfer of a case for convenience
of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice (as authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1404)
is not a motion involving an objection to "improper venue" within federal rule 12 and
can be made after answer. Spence v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 89 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio
1950).
1"1 RCW 4.12.027; Rule 1, Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 34A Wn.2d.
148 In State ex rel. Poussier v. Superior Court, 98 Wash. 565, 168 Pac. 164 (1917),
and State ex rel. Owen v. Superior Court, 110 Wash. 49, 187 Pac. 708 (1920), the
court held that the motion was not improper when not accompanied by demurrer or
answer. There is authority that a motion for change of venue on the ground of improper
venue is waived if not made when the defendant appears generally. In State ex rel.
Livingston v. Superior Court, 175 Wash. 405, 27 P.2d 729 (1933), it was held a special
appearance by defendant to challenge a garnishment on the ground that no service
of summons or complaint had been made upon him did not waive the right to request a
change of venue on the ground of improper venue, which request was made after his
first motion in his special appearance was denied. The court held that the challenge
to the garnishment was a special appearance, but stated that if it had been a general
appearance the motion for change of venue would have been waived.
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by answer. It is probable that objection could be taken after answer
on the ground that there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 49
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Entitling Plaintiff
to Relief. A motion to dismiss on this ground would be the substitute
for our present demurrer on the ground that the complaint fails to state
facts which constitute a cause of action."' Generally speaking, the
motion performs the same function as such a demurrer. It would prob-
ably be less difficult to obtain a favorable ruling on our present de-
murrer than on the motion under the proposed rules because the re-
quirements for the complaint would be liberalized.15" ' Many federal
cases illustrate the broad principle that a motion to dismiss for insuffi-
ciency of the complaint should not be granted unless it appears to a
certainty that no state of facts entitling the defendant to relief could
be proved under the complaint." 2 A motion to dismiss on this ground
is further distinguished from a demurrer by the provision that in the
discretion of the court it may be a "speaking motion," and may be
treated as a motion for summary judgment.
It has been said that under the federal rule it is not proper to use a
motion to dismiss the answer to challenge the sufficiency of an affirma-
tive defense in the answer. Rather, a motion to strike under rule 12 (f)
should be used. 5'
Proposed Rule 12(c)
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings
are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule [56]-, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule [56]
The proposed rule would replace Rule 19.2 of the Rules of Pleading,
Practice and Procedure. The first sentence of the present rule is re-
149 Treatment of venue objections under RCW 4.12.010(1) is illustrative. This sec-
tion, which specifies the place of actions regarding real property, is jurisdictional.
Cugini v. Apex Mercury Mining Co., 24 Wn.2d 401, 165 P.2d 82 (1946). In Miles v.
Chinto Mining Co., 21 Wn.2d 902, 153 P.2d 856, 156 P2d 235 (1944), the point of
jurisdiction was first raised on appeal. The venue requirement of RCW 4.12.010(2)
for actions involving personal property are also jurisdictional. Snyder v. Ingram, 48
Wn.2d 637, 296 P.2d 305 (1956).
150 See discussion of abolition of demurrers under rule 7, supra.
15l Footnote 150, supra.
-52 Cases are collected in note 6, 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PnAcrlcE 2245-2246 (1948).
"553 Proposed rule 12 (f). The substance rather than the form of the motion should
usually be determinative. Proposed rule 8(e) (1).
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tained. The second sentence is deleted, and a new provision is substi-
tuted. The second sentence of Rule 19.2 now states that the denial of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings shall not entitle the opponent
to judgment on pleadings in his favor if there is any material issue pre-
sented by the pleadings.1 4
Prior to the adoption of this provision, the court had held that the
motion invited judgment against the movant even though material
issues of fact remained on the pleadings after refusal of relief in favor
of the movant.1 ' The above mentioned second sentence of Rule 19.2
reversed that holding.
Would abrogation of the second sentence of Rule 19.2 by the new
rule restore the prior holding mentioned above? It does not appear
that such a result would follow. The prior holding mentioned is con-
trary to the general spirit of the proposed rules and would be somewhat
inconsistent with the new provision that a motion for judgment on the
pleadings may be treated as a motion for summary judgment. A federal
case raising this exact point has not been discovered, but several related
cases have some bearing on the matter. One federal court said that
even if both parties move for judgment, the motions should be denied
if there are any material fact issues. "' In another case plaintiff moved
for summary judgment. In support of his motion he made the novel
argument that there were no real fact issues in the suit because the
defendant had made a motion on his part for judgment on the plead-
ings and thereby had admitted the untruth of his denials of plaintiff's
allegations. This contention was denied. 7
The provision for treatment of a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings as a motion for summary judgment is not presently authorized by
Rule 19 of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure. Such treat-
ment would be within the discretion of the court. 8
If the motion were not treated as a motion for summary judgment
154 Rule 19.2, Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A Wn.2d (cumulative
supplement).
'" State v. Vinther, 183 Wash. 350, 48 P.2d 915 (1935), rehearing, 186 Wash. 691,
58 P2d 357 (1936). The dissent on rehearing analyzes many prior Washington cases.
As a consequence of this case, the court treated a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, which challenged the complaint, as an exercise of the statutory right to object
to the complaint after answer. Treated as such an objection the court said that the
motion did not invite judgment for plaintiff. Springer v. Superior Court 4 Wn.2d 53,
102 P2d 266 (1940).
16 United States v. Hole, 38 F. Supp. 600 (D.C. Mont. 1941).
157 M. Snower & Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 367 (7th cir. 1944).
Irs An illustrative case is Fletcher v. Nostadt, 205 F.2d 896 (9th cir. 1953). Recent
cases are noted in BARRoN AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTIcUE AND PROCEDURE, 1956
Pocket Part, 191.
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most of the present rules for such motions would still be effective. 59
Proposed Rule 12(d)
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defense specifically enumerated
(1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading
or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision
(c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on applica-
tion of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and deter-
mination thereof be deferred until the trial.
The rule of this subdivision has already been mentioned. 6" It recog-
nizes that in some cases a decision on the ground of defenses listed in
Rule 12 (b) may dispose of a case without the expense, time and incon-
venience of preparation for a trial going to the merits. As the rule is
phrased, the holding of hearings on these defenses prior to trial would
be discretionary with the judge. But if the defenses should appear sub-
stantial and the matter can be dealt with by hearing on motion a judge
should deal with them prior to trial. If the judge should feel that the
issues raised go to the merits or that the issues could more easily be
decided in the light of facts that would be brought out at the trial, he
would probably refuse such a preliminary determination. 6 ' The motion
for preliminary determination of such defenses would state that the
issues raised may be determined separately and that if the defense is
good, trial of the other issues in the case is unnecessary.'
Proposed Rule 12(e)
(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to which
a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he
may move for a more definite statement before interposing his respon-
sive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and
the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court
is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such
other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
This motion is somewhat similar to the motion to make definite and
certain now in use in our state. It has been stated many times that the
motion under the federal rule will not lie to obtain facts for use in the
defense at the trial.16" ' For this purpose discovery rules are designed
159 Federal authority (since 1938) for the practice of "searching the record" on the
motion has not been found.
160 See discussion of rule 12 (b), supra.
161 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2274-2275 (1948).
1622 BENDER'S FEDERAL PRAcTIcE FoR s 328 (1956).
163 Many cases are collected at 2 MooRSE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 2281-2284, (1948). "With
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to afford the defendant the means to defend on the facts at the trial.
Therefore the motion will only lie if the complaint is so stated that
the defendant cannot intelligently frame his answer.'" The fact that
alternative and hypothetical allegations are permissible must be taken
into account, as well as the fact that allegations in terms of conclusions
of law are permissible. The fact that pleadings can be rather general
should be taken into account. It probably should be assumed that com-
plaint forms quoted in connection with rule 8(a) are good against a
motion to make definite and certain."'s Contrary to this conclusion,
some federal courts have granted the motion to make such complaints
more specific and to make certain complaints indicate the theory upon
which they are based. 6 ' In any event, the requirement that a complaint
must be sufficiently clear to enable defendant to answer still remains,
and the motion is available under rule 12(e) to remedy lack of such
clarity.167
Nevertheless, under the system of general pleadings set forth in
rule 8(a), a restricted use of the motion is contemplated. The granting
of the motion would be largely in the discretion of the trial court as
it is now.
Bills of particulars are not authorized. 68 Discovery procedures would
be used instead.
It is arguable that under code pleading the motion to make definite
and certain is theoretically available to obtain amendment of the com-
plaint to state more details in terms of ultimate fact statements, and
the request for a bill of particulars is theoretically available for the
defendant to obtain details which are not ultimate facts. 6 ' Such a
distinction, if it exists, is difficult to make in daily practice. General
allegations of negligence, allegations not specific as to time and place in
respect to preparations for trial, the party is properly relegated to the various methods
of examination and discovery provided in the rules for that purpose." Notes of Advis-
ory Committee on Amendments to Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. § 337, 339.
164 ". . . the motion provided for is confined to one for more definite statement to
be obtained only in cases where the movant cannot reasonably be required, to frame
an answer or other responsive pleading to the pleading in question." Notes of Advisory
Committee on Amendments to Rules, note 1, supra.
166 Cases so holding are cited in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 2283 (1948).
10 Use of the motion for this purpose is discussed in a note at 35 Col. L. Rev. 888
(1950).
167 See cases cited in note 11, 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRacncE 2281 (1948).10S Prior to the amendment of the federal rules in 1946, rule 12 provided for bills
of particulars. The practice of granting such bills was in great confusion. Notes of
Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules, note 2, supra.165 The Washington cases do not appear to establish such a definite distinction. For
example, in Goupille v. Chaput, 43 Wash. 702, 86 Pac. 1058 (1906), a distinction be-
tween the motion and bill is made, but the distinction is not clear. The distinction has
been specifically ignored in some states. CLARK, CODE PLEAD G, 339 (2d ed. 1947).
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negligence charges and many other allegations which would withstand
demurrer are now subject to motion to make definite and certain and in
practice the relief of an order of a bill of particulars may sometimes be
granted. In some trial courts motions for more definite statements or
bills of particulars have probably been refused more often since the
adoption of our present discovery rules, but the proposed rules defi-
nitely contemplate a more limited area in which relief should be granted.
Under the terms of this subdivision and of subdivsion (f) and (g),
if a motion to make definite and certain is not made at the time of
motion on any other grounds mentioned in Rule 12, the objection is
waived."' In spite of the terms of these subdivisions there is some dif-
ference of opinion under the federal rules as to whether or not a motion
to make definite and certain can be made prior to a motion to dismiss
(to pave the way for such a motion)." Under proper circumstances
such a preliminary motion can be made prior to the making of a
demurrer under our present rule." 2
Proposed Rule 12(f)
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before re-
sponding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by
these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the
service of the pleading upon him or upon the court's own initiative at
any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insuffi-
cient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.
In general, a motion to strike is now available to a party under most
of the circumstances outlined in the proposed rule. 7 Also, much of
the matter which may now be stricken could be stricken on motion
under the proposed rule. Degrading irrelevant charges, legal arguments
or legal conclusions coupled with argument, allegations so general that
they do not inform concerning the claim or defense, etc. may be
stricken on motion under the federal rule. 4 However, it has been said
170 See discussion of rules (12(g), (h), supra.
1712 MoopR, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 2306-2308 (1948).
172 Rule 6(5), General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn2d.
173 However, insufficiency of an affirmative defense is grounds for demurrer under
RCW 4.32.200. In the early case of Hatch v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor Ry.
Co., 6 Wash. 1, 32 Pac. 1063 (1893), the court held that the proper method of question-
ing the sufficiency of an answer in law was not by motion to strike but by demurrer.
There is a problem of distinguishing between an attack by motion to strike on the
ground of irrelevancy or immateriality of a defense and an attack by demurrer. Thus,
affirmative matter in a reply was stricken although it appears the objection may have
been that the matter was not a good reply in law. Loewe v. Osner & Melhorn, Inc.,
109 Wash. 124, 186 Pac. 643 (1919).
174 Illustrative cases are cited in BAMoN AND HOLTZOFF 727-744 (1950).
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in the federal cases that motions to strike on grounds such as irrele-
vancy are not favored and if the matter attacked has any bearing on
the case it should not be stricken. Or even if such matters have no
bearing on the case, the motion should be overruled if the matter is not
prejudicial to the defendant.17 A great deal of discretion is given the
judge.
The motion would not lie in other circumstances under which it may
now be used. For example, it would not be granted to strike statements
of evidential facts merely because such statements are technically state-
ments of such facts."' Inconsistent allegations are permitted and there-
fore motions to strike will not lie merely because of the existence of
such inconsistency."'
When the motion is made to challenge the sufficiency of the answer
a federal court has held that it searches the record as a demurrer to
an affirmative defense now does." 8
Proposed Rule 12(g) and Rule 12(h)
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who makes a motion
under this rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for
and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule
and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available
to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and objec-
tions which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore pro-
vided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1)
that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made
by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, when-
ever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed
of as provided in Rule 15 (b) in the light of any evidence that may
have been received.
175 An interesting example is Wanecke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 403
(N.D. Ohio 1950).
170 Footnote 175, supra.
177 Some federal cases have held that the rules do not authorize a motion to strike
an allegation or pleading on the ground that it is a sham in the sense that it is false
in fact, unless the attack is on the basis that rule 11 has been violated. See Intra-Mar
Shipping v. John S. Emory & Co. 11 F.R.D. 284 ,S.D.N.Y. 1951) and cases cited. See
discussion in 2 F.R. Serv. 644 (1940) to the opposite effect.
178 Gunder v. New York Times Co., 37 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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These are the subdivisions which indicate that the pleading of de-
fenses should generally be in two stages-by motions authorized under
rule 12 and by answer, or in one stage-by answer. As previously
pointed out, certain miscellaneous motions may be made which are
not in terms covered by any of the provisions of rule 12.'1 The making
of these motions prior to motions mentioned in rule 12 will not waive
the right to raise by motion the defenses and objections covered by
rule 12.180 But it is clear that if the defenses mentioned in rule 12 (b)
are raised by motion prior to answer or responsive pleading, the remain-
ing defenses then available to the pleader which could have been raised
by motion under the rule (but are not) are waived and cannot be made
even in the answer, except as stated in subdivision (h). If no motion
is made under rule 12 (b) however, all of the defenses listed in rule
12 (b) may be made by answer. Except for the defenses stated in sub-
division 12(h), all of these defenses which have not been raised by
motion and which are not stated in the answer are waived.
The federal decisions do not make clear whether the motions to make
definite and certain and to strike come within the above rules. The
question raised is whether the defenses listed in subdivision 12(b)
(other than those which cannot be waived) must be joined with the
above two motions. Some cases have held that they need not be.
However, it appears from subdivision (b) that if no motions are
made to raise defenses mentioned in rule 12(b) and motions to make
more definite and certain and to strike are not made before interposing
a responsive pleading, the right to make such motions is waived. 1'
If the three defenses which are not waived under the terms of sub-
division (h) are not made by motion or answer, they may be raised
at any time thereafter. They would usually be raised by motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or motion to dismiss at the trial. 8
Our present rules generally contemplate a two-stage system of de-
fense to a pleading with certain exceptions such as challenges to juris-
diction of the person and cbjections to venue.' 8' Since all motions and
demurrers or other challenges to a pleading should be made at the
same time (except when a decision on a motion is necessary for a
ruling on a demurrer), the plan of defense embodied in rule 12 would
179 See discussion of defense by motion and answer under rule (12 (b), supra.
180 The wording of the rule leads to this conclusion. Parker v. Transcontinental &
Western Air, footnote 134, supra.
181 This question is discussed in BAPRON AND HOLTZoFF 765-767 (1950).
282 1 BARRON AND) HOLTZOFF 756-757 (1950).
188 Rule 6(5), General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn.2d.
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not be unfamiliar.
Looking at the overall changes which would be made in the methods
of asserting defenses, one can hazard the guess that lawyers of the
state would not have any great difficulty adapting their present expe-
rience to the procedure contemplated for pleading defenses. To the
extent that general pleading is allowed, the job of pleading defenses is
different, however. In this connection it should be remembered that
rule 12 was originally conceived as part of the pre-trial procedure
which includes our present discovery rules borrowed from the federal
rules.
